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Board of Directors Network Centrality and Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) Performance 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: Drawing from social capital, social network theory of stakeholder influence, and 
stakeholder management, this study examines the relationship between board network 
centrality and firms’ environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance.  
 
Design/methodology/approach: Using social network analysis, we construct five board 
network centrality, namely degree centrality (the number of connections), closeness centrality 
(distance among firms), eigenvector centrality (the quality of connections), betweenness 
centrality (how often a firm sits between two other firms), and the information centrality (the 
speed and reliability of information), as measures of board access for social capital and timely 
information.  
 
Findings: Using a sample of non-financial firms listed in the UK FTSE 350 index from 2007 
to 2018, we find that board networks, measured by degree, closeness, eigenvector, betweenness, 
and information centrality, have positive influence on firms’ environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) performance. Furthermore, our findings show that there is a non-linear 
relationship between board networks and ESG performance and this relationship is stronger in 
the sectors where firms that have high product market concentration and high percentage of 
women board members.   
 
Originality: This study unveils that strong board network centrality brings higher social 
(reputational) capital and information advantages to the firm to effectively, timely, and 
accurately deal with the pressures from stakeholders (stakeholder management), which leads 
to better environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance.  
 
 
Keywords: board network centrality; social network analysis; stakeholder management; ESG 
performance; non-linear 
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Introduction 
In the digital and social media era where the speed and ease of connectivity are 
significantly faster, informal social and professional networks have become the essential part 
of corporate strategic operations (Collins and Clark, 2003; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). Extant 
studies have demonstrated that a firm’s networks or often referred to a firm’s “social capital” 
have been found to enhance innovation (Ahuja, 2000; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998), knowledge 
transfer (Burt, 1992; 1997; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Koka and Prescott, 2002), intellectual 
capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), and efficiency (Baker, 1990; Burt, 2000). Adler and 
Kwon (2002) define social capital as “the goodwill (sympathy, trust, and forgiveness) that 
others have offered us is considered as a valuable resource” (pg. 18). Furthermore, a firm’s 
social capital is largely facilitated by their direct and indirect links to other firms through 
director interlocks. Empirical studies also find that a firm’s networks built from its board of 
directors contribute to the boards’ ability to make more effective strategic decisions (Carpenter 
and Westphal, 2001; Thorgren, Wincent, and Anokhin, 2010). Our study extends this research 
stream by focusing on the board of directors’ networks and the relationship between board 
networks and firms’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. 
     Existing literature has examined the impact of social and professional networks of the 
top executives and board of directors on firms’ financial performance and generally find that 
there is a positive relationship between them (e.g., Chahine and Goergen, 2013; Chuluun, 
Prevost, and Puthenpurackal, 2014; Horton, Millo, and Serafeim, 2012; Larcker, So, and Wang, 
2013). Recent studies have also found that there is a positive relationship between US firms’ 
alliance network centrality and corporate social performance (Macaulay et al., 2018; Vo, Le 
and Kim, 2020). Muthuri, Matten, and Moon (2009) also find a positive relation between the 
networks built from employees’ volunteerism and firms’ corporate social performance on three 
UK multinational firms. We extend this strand of literature and focus on the board of directors 
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for UK firms because of two reasons. First, the structure of board in the UK consists of 
executive and non-executive directors who work closely together and are collectively 
responsible for the firm performance (e.g., Conyon and Peck, 1998; Elmagrhi, Ntim, and Wang, 
2016; Hopt and Leyens, 2004; Van Veen and Elbertsen, 2008). Bainbridge (2017) indicates 
that the collective responsibilities of the board in the UK has increased the importance and the 
influence of board of directors’ monitoring and advising roles on firm performance. Second, 
the informal professional and social networks in the UK have been considered as deficient 
relative to other developed countries such as the US (e.g., Conyon and Muldoon, 2006; Letki, 
2008; Pichler and Wallace, 2007; Useem, 1984). Thus, our study highlights the importance of 
board networks for the UK firms.  
    In the wake of corporate scandals and the 2007 global financial crisis, corporate social 
responsibility performance has drawn much attention among top executives, investors, and 
academics. The United Nations Global Compact (2017) indicates that there are over 9,000 
companies and 4,000 non-businesses across 161 countries have taken serious commitments to 
address social issues, specifically actions to improve the environment, social, and governance 
(ESG) performance. More specifically, UK has considered corporate social responsibility or 
ESG performance seriously since UK was the first country in the world to appoint a Minister 
for Corporate Social Responsibility in March 2000. However, similar to most of other 
developed countries (e.g., United States), ESG activities in the UK are mostly practiced by 
large multinational corporations at which the power of shareholders’ interests seems to 
dominate the interests of non-investing stakeholder (Brammer, Jackson, and Matten, 2012; 
Goergen et al., 2019; Kinderman, 2012; Wang et al., 2019). Thus, researchers have argued that 
the role of board of directors in the UK firms has become increasingly critical to represent the 
interests from the non-investing stakeholders along with the shareholders’ interests (Aguilera, 
5 
 
2005; Aguilera et al., 2006; Elmagrhi, Ntim and Wang, 2016; Hillenbrand, Money, and 
Ghobadian, 2013; Money and Schepers, 2007).  
      Our study argues that having board of directors with strong networks would allow 
directors to draw the resources embedded within each director’s social and professional 
networks, which are accessible through direct and indirect professional ties (Booth-Bell, 2018; 
Jang, Chung and Woo, 2019; Kacanski, 2019; Krenn, 2017). These resources increase firms’ 
information advantages to satisfy the needs of and to address the pressures from non-investing 
stakeholders, thus leads to better ESG performance. Drawing from the social capital (Adler and 
Kwon, 2002) and social network theory of stakeholder influence (Rowley, 1997) and 
stakeholder management theory, we argue that board networks represents valuable social 
capital that can be mobilized to enhance firms’ ability to gain faster and more accurate 
information to satisfy the needs of the stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 
1995; Rowley, 1997). We focus on board of directors because they have broader networks 
through their services on multiple companies (interlocking) and the board of directors have 
advising and monitoring roles, which lead to firms’ tangible strategic actions (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999). We argue that firms with stronger board networks have higher ability to tap 
information from their networks to understand recent developments to address the pressures 
from various stakeholders more quickly and more effectively and therefore leads to better ESG 
performance.  
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Board networks and corporate social performance 
The theory of social capital has been developed from sociology and psychology 
literature where researchers have recognized the value of networks as irreplaceable social 
capital (Bourdieu, 1972; 1985; Burt, 1987; Jacobs, 1961). Recently, management and business 
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literature have adopted social capital theory to explain the benefits of networks (Adler and 
Kwon, 2002; Seibert, Kraimer, and Liden, 2001; Woolcock and Narayanan, 2000). More 
specifically, the social capital theory has been used to explain the information channels among 
board of directors (Horton et al., 2012; Larcker et al., 2013; Chuluun et al., 2014) in relation to 
corporate financial performance. 
The informal social and professional networks are usually built based on commonalities 
among the network participants (e.g., having similar careers, professions, etc.). Members of the 
networks can tap into the knowledge shared among members within the networks to advance 
their knowledge, know how, and more importantly critical and timely information that allow 
the members to make more effective decision-making (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). Social 
and professional networks differ from others because they can maintain their power and can 
insulate themselves from traditional hierarchical organizational power. Within the management 
discipline, informal networks have been conceptualized using either a social capital or a social 
exchange that effective workplace relationships build mutual reciprocity that delivers benefits 
to all stakeholders (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Oh, Chung, and Labianca, 2004; Sparrowe et al., 
2001).  
Adler and Kwon (2002) define the “social capital” as resources available to actors that 
is a function of their “location” within the networks of their social relations. We argue that 
board members who hold multiple positions in other companies have advantageous location 
within their social and professional. Woolcock (1998) and Woolcock and Narayanan (2000) 
specifically define the “social capital” as having access to information that are available only 
if ones belong to the networks. Drawing from the resource theory of social exchange, Foa and 
Foa (1974; 1980) also indicate that the value of social capital specifically focuses on having 
access to critical information exchange within the social networks. Therefore, we argue that 
board with greater networks have greater information advantages than boards with less 
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networks. Therefore, the relative position of board in the network plays a critical role on their 
ability to gain access toward more accurate and timely information, especially with respect to 
addressing the stakeholders’ needs. The firms’ ability to effectively address the stakeholders’ 
needs will result in higher ESG performance (Swanson and Orlitzky, 2018).   
     Extant literature has found that corporate governance effectiveness, monitoring, and 
corporate decision-making are influenced by board of directors’ informal professional and 
social networks (Alipour et al., 2019; Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008; Harjoto, Laksmana 
and Yang, 2019; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007; Kuhnen, 2009; Seidel, Polzer, and 
Stewart, 2000). For instance, Cohen et al. (2010) find that sell-side analysts who have 
educational connections with companies’ board of directors tend to perform better in their stock 
recommendations. Renneboog and Zhao (2011) indicate that directors’ networks are important 
to firms because through its directors a firm can “gain access to information, even prior to its 
public disclosures”. Directors with stronger networks can also increase the firms’ reputation in 
the society due to their close network relationships with key stakeholders (e.g., employees’ 
organization, regulatory agencies, etc.). Macaulay et al. (2018) find a positive relationship of 
women boards and outside directors as proxies for board network alliance and firms’ ESG 
performance. We extend the existing literature by examining the relationship between board 
network centrality and ESG performance.   
Rowley (1997) develops the theory of stakeholder influence based on the social 
network structure and argues that network theory allows us to examine system of a dyadic 
(network or cobweb) of interactions, influences, and the interdependencies among stakeholders 
and the firm. More importantly, he argues that the centrality of firms’ corporate actors (i.e., 
board of directors) in the network relative to others increases the firms’ ability and 
effectiveness to accommodate and to respond to stakeholders’ demands (stakeholder 
management).  
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------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
     We illustrate the interconnections between social capital and social network of 
stakeholder influence and stakeholder management in Figure 1. We argue that boards with 
higher networks can bring social capital to the firm. More specifically, board networks allow 
the firms to have access to high quality information (information advantage). Thus, firms with 
boards that are in a central position in the network may have better understanding of the 
stakeholders’ needs that allow the firms to have closer connections to various stakeholder 
groups. As indicated by arrow A in Figure 1, the social capital theory (Adler and Kwon, 2002) 
and the social network of stakeholder influence theory (Rowley, 1997) both explain the 
importance of board networks for firms to manage the pressures from stakeholders. 
Furthermore, closer connections allow them to have a faster and more accurate understanding 
of the networks, coalitions, and complex interconnections of various stakes among 
stakeholders. Directors with higher (more essential) network centrality can bring greater 
insights for stakeholder management to the firms to construct a rational stakeholder map and 
are able to strategically, effectively, and more efficiently address the pressures and the interests 
of their stakeholders (arrow B of Figure 1). The firms’ competitive advantages to effectively 
address their stakeholders’ demands translates into higher ESG performance (arrow C of Figure 
1). Firms with well-connected board of directors also have higher social and reputational 
capital at stake and they have stronger incentive to protect their social and reputational capital 
(Adler and Kwon, 2002; Seibert et al., 2001; Woolcock and Narayanan, 2000). Corporate social 
responsibility and philanthropic activities can generate positive moral capital that provides the 
“insurance like” to protect firms’ reputational (social) capital (Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey, Merrill 
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and Hansen, 2009). Therefore, firms with well-connected boards also have stronger incentives 
to support firms’ social responsibility activities to protect their own reputational capital and 
maintain their central positions in the network. Thus, we expect that board with stronger 
networks, which represents firms’ reputational (social) capital, tend to have higher ESG 
performance. We formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis:  Firms that have board of directors with higher network centrality have higher 
ESG performance. 
 
Research Design 
Data and sample 
Our sample composed of 203 non-financial firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
FTSE 350 index from 2007 to 2018. Based on these 203 UK non-financial firms, we collect 
our data from multiple sources. First, we gather information on board of directors from the 
BoardEx database, which provides a comprehensive information on directors of public listed 
firms in the UK We use this information to construct five measures of board networks, namely 
degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality and 
information centrality. Second, the data on board size, board independence, CEO tenure, CEO 
age, CEO education, CEO gender, the percentage of women board members and busy board 
are obtained from BoardEx. Third, environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) 
data is manually collected from the Bloomberg. Bloomberg started to report the ESG scores 
since 2007 (Grewal, Hauptmann, and Serafeim, 2017). Finally, we collect firms’ financial 
information and institutional ownership data from the Bloomberg that provides definitive 
source of company information for the UK firms. After deleting missing observations, our final 
sample consists of 199 UK non-financial firms that are listed on the FTSE 350 index with 1,724 
company-year observations for the period of 2007 to 2018. 
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Measurement of Variables and Empirical Models 
Dependent Variable 
We measure the overall ESG performance using the sum of environmental score (ENV), 
social score (SOC) and governance score (GOV)or ESG score. Each ENV, SOC and GOV 
score ranges from 0 to 100, depending on firms’ performance on environmental, social, and 
corporate governance, which are updated annually and are constructed based on approximately 
120 quantitative and qualitative measures by the Bloomberg analysts (Bloomberg, 2017). 
Grewal et al. (2017) indicate that the Bloomberg ESG data is constructed according to the 
standards developed by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and therefore 
represents the most accurate measures of firms’ sustainability practices.  
     The environmental score (ENV) contains data on aspects such as energy use, water 
consumption and waste generation. The social score (SOC) focuses on elements, such as 
employee turnover, number of accidents at work and the proportion of woman across the 
workforce. The governance score (GOV) includes data on aspects such as board structure and 
characteristics (Bloomberg, 2017; Giannarakis, Konteos, and Sariannidis, 2014). We also 
examine the impact of board networks on environmental (ENV), Social (SOC) and governance 
(GOV), performance separately.  
 
Independent Variables 
We follow existing literature (Chuluun et al., 2014; Houston, Lee, and Suntheim, 2018; 
Larcker et al., 2013; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011) to construct the board network centrality. 
Each firm is considered as a node in the network and two firms are connected if they share at 
least one interlocking director. Specifically, the degree centrality (DEG) measures the total 
number of direct connections to the other firms through interlocking directorates. Firms may 
be well connected if they have relatively more links than others can influence other firms or 
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use their links to access resources. The closeness centrality (CLOSE) measures how close it is 
to all other firms through the reachable shortest paths. Firms with higher closeness centrality 
can access resources or information faster than other firms. Unlike degree centrality, closeness 
is not just a local measure but also based on the distance between a firm to other firms. The 
eigenvector centrality (EIGEN) measures the quality or the power of the firm within a network. 
Firms with higher eigenvector centrality may have more power to influence other firms in terms 
of information dissemination and exchange. The betweenness centrality (BETW) measures 
how often a firm can sit between two other firms through director interlocks. If a firm sits 
between many other firms, it may act like a “gatekeeper” and control the flow of information 
through the network. The information centrality (INFO) captures its direct or indirect 
connections, not only through the shortest paths but also any other possible indirect paths to 
other firms that provide verifications on the accuracy of information. Stephenson and Zelen 
(1989) and Fitch and Leonard (2013) indicate that information centrality represents access to 
information with the least noise. Hence, firms with higher information centrality can gain more 
accurate information compared to closeness centrality, which only considers the shortest paths.  
To account for the lag effect of board networks on firms’ ESG performance, we use the one-
year lag of these five measures in our regression models.  
 
Control Variables 
Following prior studies (Horton et al., 2012; Larcker et al., 2013; Money, and Schepers, 
2007), we include a number of control variables while examining the relationship between 
board networks and ESG performance. Board size is the total number of executive and non-
executive directors. Board independence is the number of independent non-executive directors 
divided by total number of board members. Tenure measures the number of years the current 
CEO has served as the CEO of the firm in year t. Age measures the CEO’s age. Education 
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measures the number of qualifications at undergraduate level and above the current CEO have 
in year t. Gender is a dummy variable, equals 1 if CEO is female and 0 otherwise. Busy board 
is a dummy variable, equals 1 if more than half of the directors hold three or more directorships 
and 0 otherwise. Institutional measures the percentage of shares held by institutional 
shareholders to total firm ordinary shareholdings. ROA is profit before tax as percentage of 
total asset. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Detailed variable definitions, 
including dependent variables, independent variables and control variables are reported in the 
Appendix.   
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Empirical Model 
To test our hypothesis, we use both univariate and multivariate analyses. More 
specifically, our initial empirical analyses consist of (i) summary statistics; (ii) bivariate 
analysis conducted by estimating Pearson correlation coefficients; and (iii) pooled ordinary 
least square is employed as baseline model to conduct multivariate regression analysis and the 
standard errors are clustered based on firm and year.  
     Our baseline model to examine the relationship between the impact of board networks 
and ESG is specified as follows: 
              𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿𝑖 +  𝑖𝑡                       
where ESG is our dependent variables (ESG, ENV, SOC, AND GOV), the Board_Networkst-1 
is independent variable which refers to one-year lag of degree centrality, closeness centrality, 
eigenvector centrality, betweenness centrality and information centrality. CONTROLS refers 
to a set of control variables, namely, board size (BSIZE), board independence (BINDEP), CEO 
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tenure, age, education, gender (TENURE, AGE, EDUC, WCEO), busy board (BBOARD), 
institutional ownership (INSTIT), return on assets (ROA), and financial leverage (LEV).   
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Panel A of Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Summary Statistics and Regression Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for our sample. The average firms’ ESG scores 
is 36 while the averages of ESG components: environmental (ENV), social (SOC), and 
governance (GOV)scores are 25.42, 38.73 and 57.66 respectively. The averages of degree 
centrality (DEG), closeness centrality (CLOSE), eigenvector centrality (EIGEN), betweeness 
centrality (BETW), and information centrality (INFO) (stated in %) are 1.3, 13.1, 4.3, 1.21, 
and 3.99 respectively. The average board size (BSIZE) in our sample is 9.03 and 61.01% 
directors are considered as independent (non-executives) directors (BINDEP). On average, 
CEO’s tenure is 6.3 years (TENURE) and the average CEO’s age is 54.15 years old (AGE). 
On average, CEOs hold two qualifications (EDUC). Approximately, 27% of the firms have 
more than a half of their boards with three or more directorships (BBOARD) and 5% of the 
CEOs are female (WCEO). These averages are similar with existing studies (e.g., Renneboog 
and Zhao, 2011). On average, 11.33% of the firms’ shares in our sample are held by 
institutional investors (INSTIT). The average return on assets (ROA) and total debt-to-asset 
ratio (LEV) of our sample firms are 6.73% and 23.97%. On average, the firms in our sample 
has 26% industry concentration (HHI), which is consistent with Powell and Yawson (2005) 
that use the UK sample firms. Approximately, 3.5% of the board seats are held by women 
(WBOD).    
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-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Panel B of Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Panel B of Table 1 displays the distribution of our sample across nine different sectors. 
We find that firms’ ESG measures vary across different sectors. More importantly, we find that 
board networks measures are positively related to industry concentration (HHI) and the 
percentage of women boards (WBOD), which implies firms that operate in more concentrated 
industry and firms with higher percentage of women boards tend to have higher board networks.  
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
      ------------------------------- 
 
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlations between our dependent variables (ESG 
measures), board networks and control variables. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that 
ESG measures are positively and significantly correlated with the board networks measures. 
We find that five board networks measures (DEG, EIGEN, CLOSE, BETW, INFO) are 
positively and highly correlated to one another.  Therefore, we cannot include all five networks 
measures in the same regression equation due to a multicollinearity problem among five 
different board networks measures. We also find that the board size (BSIZE) and the percentage 
of independent boards (BINDEP) are also positively correlated with board network measures. 
We find that the correlations between the board network measures and control variables are 
less than 0.4.  The correlations among control variables are generally less than 0.4, except for 
the percentage of independent board (BINDEP) and the percentage of women board (WBOD). 
Thus, we would not expect any serious multicollinearity problems in our multivariate 
regressions.  
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------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Regression Results 
We examine the relationship between board networks and firms’ overall ESG 
performance. Table 3 presents the linear regression results between various measures of board 
networks and firms’ ESG performance.  We find that all of our five measures of board networks 
are positively related to firms’ ESG performance.  We find that one percent increase in boards’ 
degree of centrality (DEG), board network closeness (CLOSE), and quality (EIGEN) increase 
the ESG score by 0.631, 0.237 and 0.04 respectively. One percent increase in board 
betweenness (BETW) and information network (INFO) increases the firms’ ESG score by 
0.311 and 0.115 respectively. These findings indicate that board networks are positively 
associated with ESG performance. Thus, we find empirical evidence to support our hypothesis 
that having boards with richer networks, measured by the total number of connections to other 
firms, shortest distance to other firms, the rank of importance from direct and indirect links, 
gatekeeper and control of information flow, and access to information with the least noise, can 
facilitate the firms’ ability to better manage and meet the needs of multiple stakeholders 
(stakeholder management). 
Second, we separately examine the relations between board networks with each of the 
three components of firms’ overall ESG: environment (ENV), social (SOC), and governance 
(GOV) scores. Table 3 shows that the relationship between board networks measures and firms’ 
environment (ENV), social (SOC), and governance (GOV) scores are generally positive and 
significant, except for information centrality (INFO) and social performance (SOC). Overall 
results from examining the components of ESG support our hypothesis that greater board 
networks is positively related with better environmental (ENV), social (SOC) and governance 
16 
 
(GOV) performance. We also use the two-year lag of board networks and the unreported results 
are consistent with our reported results. 
  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Extant literature has found that there is a non-linear relationship between board 
characteristics and firm performance (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008; Chang et al., 2015). 
Therefore, we further explore whether there is a non-linear (curvilinear) relationship between 
board networks and firms’ ESG performance. We regress the quadratic function of board 
networks (e.g., DEGt-1 and DEGt-1
2) on firms’ ESG and the results are presented in Table 4. 
We find that the coefficients of board networks remain positive and statistically significant.  
However, we find that the coefficients of the squared of board networks are negative and 
statistically significant. Thus, the relationship between board networks and firms’ ESG 
performance is concave (non-linear), indicating there is a diminishing return of board networks 
on firms’ ESG performance. 
   
Additional Analysis 
Recent studies have shown that there is a relationship between board diversity and 
board networks. Booth-Bell (2018) argues that more diverse boards tend to bring more diverse 
social capital that bridge the boards’ networks and their tasks to advice, counsel, and monitor. 
Thus, board diversity enhances firms’ corporate governance through their indirect link of 
boards’ diverse networks.  Ooi, Hooy, and Som (2017) also demonstrates that board diversity 
in human and social capital network ties significantly mitigates the negative effects of crises. 
Goyal (2017) and Basuony, Mohamed, and Samaha (2018) examine the positive impacts of 
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board diversity in the UK firms and find that board gender diversity influence the effectiveness 
of the board. Kim and Starks (2016) also document that women boards provide additional 
advisory skills and expertise such as risk management, sustainability and regulatory 
compliance. They argue that greater heterogeneity of expertise that women directors bring into 
the boardrooms come from their social networks that are significantly different from men. 
Based on existing literature, we conduct further empirical investigation whether board gender 
diversity influence the firms’ board networks.  
 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Panel A of Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Furthermore, based on our descriptive statistics presented in Panel B of Table 1 
indicates that firms that operate in more concentrated sectors (higher HHI) tend to have higher 
board networks. Therefore, we also examine whether the market concentration, measured by 
HHI, influence board networks. Essentially, our additional analysis here is to account for 
potential endogeneity issue of board networks. Thus, we conduct the two-stage regression 
(2SLS) analyses where in the first stage regression, we examine the impacts of board gender 
diversity and industry concentration on the board networks. In the second stage regression, we 
examine the impact of board networks on firms’ ESG performance.  
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Panels B and C of Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
The results of the 2SLS regressions are presented in Table 5. The first stage regression 
results presented in panel A of Table 5 indicate that board gender diversity (WBOD) and 
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industry concentration (HHI) positively affect board networks. Thus, we find evidence that 
greater board gender diversity and firms that operate in sectors that are more concentrated tend 
to have higher board networks. The second stage regression results presented in both panel B 
(linear) and panel C (quadratic) are qualitatively similar to our baseline results presented in 
Tables 3 and 4 respectively, indicating our findings remain robust even after controlling for a 
potential endogeneity issue 
     
Conclusions 
Recent global financial crisis has made corporate social responsibility performance to 
become an increasingly critical aspect of firms’ business strategic and stakeholder management. 
Firms are continuously receiving pressures from their stakeholders and must strategically 
address their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns in order to manage the 
pressures from various stakeholders. Therefore, this study examines the monitoring and 
advising roles of board of directors and investigates the impact of board networks on firms’ 
ESG performance.  
Our findings indicate that having boards with greater social capital, measured by the 
board networks, is positively related with greater ESG performance. Our finding is consistent 
with the stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) by identifying the connection 
between stakeholder management and the traditional corporate objectives to gain competitive 
advantage through having boards with higher networks. Furthermore, we find that board gender 
diversity and the industry characteristic, measured by the industry concentration, are positively 
related to board networks. Therefore, board networks are endogenously determined by board 
diversity and the industry concentration.  
We also find a diminishing return on board networks on subsequent ESG performance 
indicating that a continuing increase in board networks does not always lead to higher ESG 
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performance in the subsequent period. Thus, we believe that our diminishing return of board 
networks on ESG performance result is also consistent with existing literature which indicate 
that there are potential downsides of having greater board networks that have been identified 
in the literature, such as the groupthink and less effective monitoring (Benabou, 2012; Coles, 
Daniels, and Naveen, 2015), lack of innovations (Aronson, Reilly and Lynn, 2019), and greater 
conflict of interests (Scharff, 2005).   
     Overall, our study extends the extant studies that examine the importance of board 
networks on firms’ decision-making (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Thorgren, et al., 2010) 
and the relationship between board networks and firms’ financial performance (Chahine and 
Goergen, 2013; Chuluun et al., 2014; Horton et al., 2012; Larcker et al., 2013). As illustrated 
in Figure 1, our study also extends the social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002), the social 
network theory of stakeholder influence (Rowley, 1997; Neville and Menguc, 2006), and the 
stakeholder management (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995) by establishing the 
interconnections among these theories.  
     While our study is based on a sample of UK listed firms, future studies can extend our 
study by examining the nexus of board networks and ESG performance in different 
international environments, such as the emerging markets (Singh and Delios, 2017). Given the 
diminishing return of board networks on firms’ ESG performance, we believe that future 
research could also examine whether and how increasing networks may lead to unethical 
behaviour (i.e., insider trading). Finally, although the results of this study are robust to 
alternative estimations, our study has some limitations including limiting the analysis only to 
the network of the firms’ networks through their board of directors. Future studies can consider 
also examine the firms’ social networks from outside of the firms such as industry alliance and 
joint ventures (Macaulay et al., 2018). 
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APPENDIX 
Definitions of Variables 
Panel A: Dependent Variables (ESG) 
ESGt-1 One-year lag of environmental, social, and corporate governance score. It represents 
the firms’ overall ESG  score = ENV + SOC + GOV 
ENVt-1 One-year lag of environmental measures a company's impact on living and non-
living natural systems, including the air, land and water, as well as complete 
ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses best management practices to avoid 
environmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities in order to 
generate long-term shareholder value. 
SOC t-1 One-year lag of social measures a company's capacity to generate trust and loyalty 
with its workforce, customers and society, through its use of best management 
practices. It is a reflection of the company's reputation and the health of its license 
to operate, which are key factors in determining its ability to generate long term 
shareholder value. 
GOV t-1 One-year lag of corporate governance measures a company's systems and processes, 
which ensure that its board members and executives act in the best interests of its 
long-term shareholders. It reflects a company's capacity, through its use of best 
management practices, to direct and control its rights and responsibilities through 
the creation of incentives, as well as checks and balances in order to generate long-
term shareholder value. 
  
Panel B: Independent Variables (Board Networks) 
DEG The normalized degree centrality of a firm is the number of other firms it connects 
to through director interlocks (in %). 
CLOSE The normalized closeness centrality of a firm measures how close (shortest path) it 
is to all the other reachable firms (in %). 
EIGEN The eigenvector centrality of a firm measures, not only the number of other firms it 
connects to, but also the quality of the other firms it connects to (in %). 
BETW 
 
The normalized betweenness centrality of a firm measures how often a firm can sit 
between two other firms through director interlocks (in %). 
INFO 
 
 
The information centrality of a firm captures its direct or indirect connections, not 
only through the shortest paths but also any other possible paths to other firms with 
the least noise (in %). 
  
Panel C: Control Variables 
BSIZE The total number of executive and non-executive directors.  
BINDEP Number of independent non-executive directors divided by total number of board 
members 
TENURE The number of years the current CEO has served as the CEO of the firm in year t. 
AGE CEO's age in year t.  
EDUC 
 
The number of qualifications at undergraduate level and above that current CEO has 
in year t. 
WCEO Dummy variable, 1 if CEO is female and 0 otherwise.  
BBOARD Dummy variable, 1 if more than half of the directors hold three or more  
 directorships and 0 otherwise.  
INSTIT Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders to total firm ordinary 
Shareholdings.   
ROA Profit before tax as percentage of total asset. 
LEV Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
HHI Industry concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index of firms’ net revenue in 
each year across nine sectors based on the GICS classification 
WBOD Percentage of women board (board diversity) 
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Figure 1 
 
Social Capital, Social Network of Stakeholder Influence, Stakeholder Management, and 
ESG Performance 
 
 
Social Capital 
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Figure 1 displays the interconnections among social capital, social networks of stakeholder 
influence, stakeholder management, and ESG performance 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min 25pctile Median 75ptile Max 
ESG 1724 36.00 11.10 11.11 28.10 34.30 42.15 70.12 
ENV 1724 25.42 13.98 1.55 15.50 22.48 34.11 68.60 
SOC 1724 38.73 12.91 11.11 28.07 38.60 45.61 89.47 
GOV 1724 57.66 7.06 41.07 53.57 57.14 62.5 82.14 
DEGt-1 1724 1.30 0.98 0 0.5 1.1 2 5.7 
CLOSEt-1 1724 13.10 3.41 6.3 10.83 13.8 15.7 20.2 
EIGENt-1 1724 4.30 5.84 0 0.13 2.1 6 42.9 
BETWt-1 1724 1.21 1.71 0 0 0.5 1.9 11.6 
INFOt-1 1724 3.99 1.62 0.8 4 4.6 5.2 5.8 
BSIZE 1724 9.03 2.13 4 8 9 10 19 
BINDEP 1724 61.01 12.79 0 50 62.5 71.43 92.86 
TENUR 1724 6.30 5.94 0.08 2.17 4.75 8.5 41.5 
AGE 1724 54.15 5.50 35 51 54 57 77 
EDUC 1724 1.86 1.10 0 1 2 3 6 
WCEO 1724 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1 
BBOARD 1724 26.65 29.24 0 0 25 50 100 
INSTIT 1724 11.33 3.34 0 9.63 11.27 12.66 46.06 
ROA 1724 6.73 9.01 -68.95 3.06 6.07 10.34 70.25 
LEV 1724 23.97 17.39 0 10.67 22.79 34.04 89.16 
HHI 1724 0.26 0.06 0.12 0.22 0.25 0.31 0.52 
WBOD 1724 3.49 2.44 0 2.08 3.16 5.27 12 
 
 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics across nine GICS sectors 
Sector Obs. ESG ENV SOC GOV DEG CLOSE EIGEN BETW INFO HHI WBOD 
Energy 92 41.76 31.53 46.26 60.60 0.98 12.02 2.40 0.74 3.69 0.24 3.68 
Materials 231 42.40 32.86 45.09 61.63 1.30 12.42 3.69 1.27 3.71 0.25 2.64 
Industrials 492 43.62 33.24 50.78 60.22 1.80 15.02 6.62 2.10 4.78 0.25 3.23 
Con. Discr. 362 37.65 28.18 41.02 58.27 1.09 12.48 3.50 0.92 3.71 0.23 3.68 
Con. Stap. 212 35.75 26.22 35.43 57.83 1.48 14.03 5.72 1.44 4.44 0.30 2.84 
Healthcare 81 34.53 24.26 35.23 55.68 0.96 12.59 2.66 0.56 3.69 0.28 3.03 
Info Tech 55 23.85 11.16 28.48 53.21 0.96 12.10 3.58 0.82 3.33 0.28 2.96 
Communic. 138 37.27 26.63 39.70 59.23 1.06 12.66 3.81 0.73 3.73 0.25 3.84 
Utilities 61 32.91 21.11 37.34 56.29 1.52 13.76 5.12 1.55 4.30 0.27 2.53 
See Appendix for variables definitions. 
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TABLE 2 
Pearson Correlations 
 
No Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 ESG 1          
2 ENV 0.955* 1         
3 SOC 0.809* 0.653* 1        
4 GOV 0.761* 0.669* 0.556* 1       
5 DEGt-1 0.199* 0.179* 0.154* 0.190* 1      
6 CLOSEt-1 0.266* 0.225* 0.261* 0.211* 0.705* 1     
7 EIGENt-1 0.107* 0.094* 0.076* 0.116* 0.763* 0.556* 1    
8 BETWt-1 0.156* 0.137* 0.131* 0.155* 0.821* 0.503* 0.702* 1   
9 INFOt-1 0.239* 0.207* 0.219* 0.198* 0.635* 0.879* 0.421* 0.392* 1  
10 BSIZE 0.396* 0.364* 0.301* 0.399* 0.151* 0.162* 0.104* 0.157* 0.178* 1 
11 BINDEP 0.357* 0.3366* 0.331* 0.249* 0.289* 0.404* 0.206* 0.183* 0.331* 0.157* 
12 TENUR -0.099* -0.095* -0.057 -0.092* -0.147* -0.142* -0.092* -0.123* -0.154* -0.005 
13 AGE 0.105* 0.094* 0.097* 0.123* 0.008 -0.009 0.003 0.011 0.014 0.119* 
14 EDUC 0.172* 0.156* 0.134* 0.192* 0.058 0.057 0.018 0.030 0.071* 0.193* 
15 WCEO 0.072* 0.057 0.087* 0.036 0.048 0.109* 0.005 0.026 0.089* 0.004 
16 BINTERL 0.145* 0.123* 0.156* 0.097* 0.227* 0.358* 0.114* 0.122* 0.291* -0.049 
17 PCTINSTI -0.181* -0.174* -0.161* -0.128* -0.139* -0.208* -0.092* -0.101* -0.182* -0.137* 
18 ROA -0.125* -0.094* -0.150* -0.094* 0.015 -0.013 -0.007 0.044 0.0001 -0.014 
19 LEV 0.073* 0.066* 0.039 0.060 0.008 0.017 0.025 -0.001 0.010 0.139* 
20 HHI -0.013 -0.005 -0.066* 0.010* 0.131* 0.060* 0.168* 0.128* 0.065* 0.061 
21 WBOD 0.309* 0.268* 0.319* 0.164* 0.236* 0.441* 0.185* 0.171* 0.340* 0.193* 
 
No Variables 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
11 BINDEP 1           
12 TENUR -0.205* 1          
13 AGE 0.049 0.280* 1         
14 EDUC 0.107* 0.080* 0.096* 1        
15 WCEO 0.079* -0.054 -0.091* 0.076* 1       
16 BINTERL 0.231* -0.059 -0.111* 0.007 0.034 1      
17 PCTINSTI -0.213* 0.009 0.020 -0.069* 0.050 -0.079* 1     
18 ROA -0.053 0.079* 0.015 -0.069* -0.022 -0.067* -0.073* 1    
19 LEV -0.007 -0.124* -0.052 0.061 -0.027 -0.020 -0.033 -0.205* 1   
20 HHI 0.025 -0.015 -0.051 -0.035 -0.019 0.003 -0.029 0.018 0.013 1  
21 WBOD 0.408* -0.046 -0.047 0.028 0.224* 0.292* -0.165* 0.015 0.062* 0.013 1 
t statistics in parentheses and * p < 0.01. See Appendix for variables definitions. 
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TABLE 3 
Linear Regression for Board Networks and ESG Performance 
 
 ESG ENV SOC GOV ESG ENV SOC GOV ESG ENV SOC 
DEGREEt-1 0.631 0.677 0.251 0.537        
 (2.72)*** (2.19)** (1.88)* (3.39)***       
CLOSEt-1     0.237 0.239 0.155 0.204    
     (2.94)*** (2.25)** (1.69)* (3.83)***   
EIGENt-1         0.040 0.032 0.016 
         (2.15)** (1.70)* (2.10)** 
BSIZE 1.643 1.841 1.511 1.095 1.628 1.829 1.491 1.082 1.675 1.877 1.529 
 (15.14)*** (13.00)*** (11.38)*** (15.13)*** (15.02)*** (12.90)*** (11.26)*** (14.94)*** (15.57)*** (13.38)*** (11.62)*** 
BINDEP 0.176 0.232 0.182 0.063 0.174 0.230 0.178 0.061 0.184 0.241 0.187 
 (9.57)*** (9.61)*** (7.97)*** (4.82)*** (9.43)*** (9.56)*** (7.72)*** (4.63)*** (10.01)*** (10.04)*** (8.19)*** 
TENURE -0.097 -0.098 -0.050 -0.100 -0.093 -0.095 -0.046 -0.097 -0.103 -0.106 -0.054 
 (2.61)*** (2.01)** (1.05) (4.26)*** (2.52)** (1.96)* (0.95) (4.16)*** (2.81)*** (2.19)** (1.12) 
AGE 0.135 0.141 0.129 0.121 0.132 0.138 0.126 0.118 0.137 0.143 0.130 
 (3.15)*** (2.50)** (2.56)** (4.16)*** (3.08)*** (2.45)** (2.51)** (4.10)*** (3.19)*** (2.54)** (2.58)*** 
EDUCATION 0.417 0.491 0.154 0.470 0.403 0.477 0.144 0.458 0.422 0.496 0.155 
 (2.01)** (1.77)* (0.62) (3.33)*** (1.94)* (1.72)* (0.58) (3.24)*** (2.02)** (1.79)* (0.63) 
GENDER 1.955 1.722 3.367 0.669 1.843 1.616 3.267 0.572 2.066 1.838 3.406 
 (1.66)* (1.16) (2.25)** (0.94) (1.55) (1.08) (2.17)** (0.80) (1.74)* (1.23) (2.27)** 
BBOARD 0.015 0.026 -0.003 0.009 0.015 0.026 -0.004 0.008 0.019 0.030 -0.001 
 (1.83)* (2.32)** (0.27) (1.48) (1.74)* (2.27)** (0.41) (1.38) (2.29)** (2.71)*** (0.09) 
INSTI -0.323 -0.409 -0.365 -0.104 -0.312 -0.398 -0.355 -0.095 -0.331 -0.418 -0.369 
 (3.82)*** (3.48)*** (4.74)*** (1.94)* (3.67)*** (3.38)*** (4.60)*** (1.75)* (3.96)*** (3.58)*** (4.82)*** 
ROA -0.087 -0.078 -0.126 -0.045 -0.088 -0.078 -0.126 -0.046 -0.085 -0.075 -0.124 
 (2.58)*** (1.86)* (2.91)*** (2.46)** (2.56)** (1.84)* (2.92)*** (2.43)** (2.50)** (1.78)* (2.88)*** 
LEV -0.006 -0.011 -0.013 0.005 -0.006 -0.011 -0.012 0.004 -0.007 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.49) (0.63) (0.79) (0.52) (0.50) (0.65) (0.78) (0.50) (0.56) (0.69) (0.82) 
Intercept 8.906 -5.305 14.784 38.098 10.402 -5.364 21.135 37.585 8.679 -5.599 14.599 
 (2.51)** (1.15) (3.60)*** (16.63)*** (2.94)*** (1.17) (5.07)*** (16.08)*** (2.44)** (1.21) (3.55)*** 
Observations 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 
R-squared 0.404 0.337 0.366 0.323 0.405 0.337 0.367 0.325 0.402 0.335 0.366 
# Firms) 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
t statistics in parentheses and * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. See Appendix for variables definitions.  
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
Linear Regression for Board Networks and ESG Performance  
 
 ESG ENV SOC GOV ESG ENV SOC GOV 
BETWEENt-1 0.311 0.283 0.174 0.266     
 (2.41)** (1.69)* (1.91)* (3.02)***    
INFOt-1     0.115 0.144 0.014 0.366 
     (2.17)** (2.05)** (0.90) (3.71)*** 
BSIZE 1.643 1.847 0.422 1.095 0.445 0.479 0.428 1.087 
 (15.03)*** (12.96)*** (3.28)*** (15.02)*** (5.06)*** (3.89)*** (3.32)*** (15.19)*** 
BINDEP 0.181 0.238 0.045 0.067 0.018 0.028 0.047 0.064 
 (9.88)*** (9.95)*** (2.35)** (5.15)*** (1.36) (1.54) (2.45)** (4.88)*** 
TENURE -0.099 -0.101 -0.011 -0.102 -0.014 -0.003 -0.009 -0.097 
 (2.68)*** (2.09)** (0.26) (4.34)*** (0.49) (0.08) (0.21) (4.13)*** 
AGE 0.137 0.143 0.147 0.122 0.060 0.021 0.149 0.117 
 (3.19)*** (2.54)** (3.38)*** (4.21)*** (2.04)** (0.52) (3.43)*** (4.05)*** 
EDUCATION 0.427 0.500 0.087 0.478 0.192 0.110 0.073 0.457 
 (2.04)** (1.80)* (0.38) (3.37)*** (1.24) (0.50) (0.32) (3.23)*** 
GENDER 1.992 1.772 4.193 0.700 0.507 -0.906 4.283 0.595 
 (1.69)* (1.19) (4.13)*** (0.99) (0.74) (0.94) (4.22)*** (0.83) 
BBOARD 0.017 0.028 -0.006 0.010 -0.001 0.009 -0.005 0.009 
 (2.08)** (2.57)** (0.82) (1.78)* (0.17) (1.27) (0.70) (1.49) 
INSTI -0.326 -0.412 -0.145 -0.107 -0.107 -0.137 -0.142 -0.098 
 (3.88)*** (3.53)*** (2.43)** (1.99)** (2.67)*** (2.43)** (2.39)** (1.81)* 
ROA -0.088 -0.078 -0.068 -0.046 -0.022 -0.004 -0.067 -0.045 
 (2.59)*** (1.85)* (3.27)*** (2.46)** (1.55) (0.19) (3.21)*** (2.41)** 
LEV -0.006 -0.011 0.029 0.005 0.030 0.043 0.028 0.005 
 (0.48) (0.64) (1.48) (0.53) (2.16)** (2.27)** (1.43) (0.52) 
Intercept 8.875 -5.400 38.263 38.074 36.538 26.924 38.146 38.418 
 (2.51)** (1.17) (8.81)*** (16.69)*** (10.62)*** (5.82)*** (8.72)*** (16.58)*** 
Observations 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 
R-squared 0.403 0.336 0.367 0.323 0.404 0.337 0.367 0.324 
# Firms 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
t statistics in parentheses and * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. See Appendix for variables definitions.  
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TABLE 4 
Quadratic Regression for Board Networks and ESG Performance 
  
 ESG ENV SOC GOV ESG ENV SOC GOV ESG ENV SOC GOV 
DEGREEt-1 2.310 2.929 1.695 0.713         
 (3.59)*** (3.59)*** (2.00)** (1.76)*         
DEGREEt-1
2 -0.504 -0.676 -0.434 -0.053         
 (2.89)*** (3.15)*** (1.80)* (0.47)         
CLOSEt-1     2.203 2.685 2.166 0.467     
     (4.54)*** (4.15)*** (3.84)*** (1.93)*     
CLOSEt-1
2     -0.082 -0.102 -0.084 -0.011     
     (4.16)*** (3.86)*** (3.70)*** (0.80)     
EIGENt-1         0.325 0.403 0.163 0.207 
         (4.12)*** (3.80)*** (1.74)* (3.65)*** 
EIGENt-1
2         -0.012 -0.016 -0.007 -0.006 
         (4.60)*** (4.58)*** (2.24)** (3.11)*** 
BSIZE 1.635 1.830 1.504 1.095 1.612 1.808 1.474 1.080 1.651 1.846 1.515 1.104 
 (15.10)*** (12.97)*** (11.35)*** (15.09)*** (14.90)*** (12.78)*** (11.16)*** (14.92)*** (15.38)*** (13.20)*** (11.53)*** (15.34)*** 
BINDEP 0.171 0.224 0.178 0.063 0.178 0.235 0.182 0.062 0.174 0.229 0.182 0.063 
 (9.19)*** (9.21)*** (7.73)*** (4.75)*** (9.70)*** (9.79)*** (7.94)*** (4.68)*** (9.40)*** (9.44)*** (7.86)*** (4.77)*** 
TENURE -0.087 -0.086 -0.042 -0.099 -0.088 -0.088 -0.040 -0.096 -0.092 -0.091 -0.047 -0.099 
 (2.35)** (1.75)* (0.87) (4.19)*** (2.39)** (1.83)* (0.84) (4.13)*** (2.51)** (1.90)* (0.99) (4.24)*** 
AGE 0.135 0.141 0.129 0.121 0.133 0.139 0.127 0.118 0.136 0.142 0.129 0.121 
 (3.15)*** (2.50)** (2.57)** (4.15)*** (3.11)*** (2.47)** (2.52)** (4.10)*** (3.17)*** (2.52)** (2.57)** (4.19)*** 
EDUCATION 0.367 0.423 0.111 0.465 0.406 0.481 0.147 0.459 0.424 0.498 0.156 0.477 
 (1.75)* (1.52) (0.45) (3.28)*** (1.95)* (1.73)* (0.60) (3.24)*** (2.04)** (1.80)* (0.63) (3.38)*** 
GENDER 1.752 1.450 3.193 0.648 1.754 1.506 3.177 0.560 1.875 1.590 3.295 0.667 
 (1.48) (0.98) (2.12)** (0.91) (1.47) (1.00) (2.12)** (0.78) (1.60) (1.08) (2.19)** (0.94) 
BBOARD 0.012 0.022 -0.005 0.008 0.016 0.028 -0.002 0.008 0.015 0.025 -0.003 0.009 
 (1.45) (1.94)* (0.53) (1.41) (1.94)* (2.46)** (0.24) (1.42) (1.84)* (2.28)** (0.31) (1.62) 
INSTI -0.313 -0.395 -0.356 -0.103 -0.310 -0.396 -0.353 -0.095 -0.323 -0.407 -0.364 -0.106 
 (3.67)*** (3.33)*** (4.60)*** (1.92)* (3.63)*** (3.34)*** (4.51)*** (1.74)* (3.85)*** (3.48)*** (4.75)*** (1.98)** 
ROA -0.091 -0.082 -0.128 -0.046 -0.085 -0.075 -0.124 -0.045 -0.088 -0.080 -0.127 -0.045 
 (2.69)*** (1.97)** (2.98)*** (2.48)** (2.50)** (1.78)* (2.88)*** (2.41)** (2.61)*** (1.90)* (2.93)*** (2.44)** 
LEV -0.005 -0.010 -0.012 0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.011 0.005 -0.007 -0.011 -0.013 0.004 
 (0.41) (0.56) (0.74) (0.53) (0.41) (0.57) (0.71) (0.52) (0.51) (0.65) (0.79) (0.47) 
Intercept 8.284 -6.139 14.249 38.033 0.118 -18.161 10.617 36.209 9.051 -5.117 14.816 38.206 
 (2.34)** (1.33) (3.47)*** (16.61)*** (0.03) (3.18)*** (2.11)** (12.66)*** (2.56)** (1.11) (3.60)*** (16.71)*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 
R-squared 0.407 0.340 0.368 0.324 0.410 0.343 0.371 0.325 0.407 0.340 0.367 0.324 
# Firms 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
t statistics in parentheses and * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. See Appendix for variables definitions.   
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Table 4 (continued) 
Quadratic Regression of Board Networks on ESG  
 
 ESG ENV SOC GOV ESG ENV SOC GOV 
BETWEENt-1 0.774 1.117 -0.562 0.501     
 (2.76)*** (3.01)*** (2.24)** (2.59)***     
BETWEENt-12 -0.074 -0.133 0.110 -0.037     
 (1.94)* (2.68)*** (3.37)*** (1.44)     
INFOt-1     1.433 2.103 0.966 1.687 
     (2.58)*** (2.69)*** (1.16) (2.55)** 
INFOt-12     -0.224 -0.333 -0.167 -0.148 
     (2.41)** (2.55)** (1.20) (1.03) 
BSIZE 1.650 1.860 0.406 1.099 0.440 0.472 0.423 1.095 
 (15.11)*** (13.08)*** (3.17)*** (15.07)*** (5.00)*** (3.83)*** (3.29)*** (15.37)*** 
BINDEP 0.176 0.229 0.048 0.065 0.020 0.031 0.049 0.062 
 (9.46)*** (9.42)*** (2.49)** (4.93)*** (1.50) (1.70)* (2.51)** (4.72)*** 
TENURE -0.096 -0.097 -0.002 -0.101 -0.015 -0.004 -0.009 -0.097 
 (2.61)*** (2.00)** (0.05) (4.28)*** (0.51) (0.11) (0.22) (4.15)*** 
AGE 0.138 0.144 0.143 0.122 0.063 0.025 0.151 0.113 
 (3.20)*** (2.56)** (3.30)*** (4.22)*** (2.13)** (0.61) (3.48)*** (3.92)*** 
EDUCATION 0.391 0.436 0.137 0.460 0.195 0.113 0.074 0.468 
 (1.87)* (1.57) (0.60) (3.22)*** (1.25) (0.52) (0.32) (3.31)*** 
GENDER 1.883 1.576 4.349 0.645 0.567 -0.816 4.327 0.534 
 (1.60) (1.06) (4.29)*** (0.91) (0.82) (0.85) (4.26)*** (0.75) 
BBOARD 0.015 0.025 -0.005 0.009 0.000 0.011 -0.005 0.008 
 (1.87)* (2.28)** (0.63) (1.61) (0.01) (1.46) (0.61) (1.35) 
INSTI -0.324 -0.410 -0.146 -0.106 -0.110 -0.142 -0.145 -0.096 
 (3.85)*** (3.50)*** (2.46)** (1.97)** (2.76)*** (2.52)** (2.43)** (1.77)* 
ROA -0.090 -0.082 -0.067 -0.047 -0.022 -0.004 -0.067 -0.047 
 (2.65)*** (1.94)* (3.24)*** (2.51)** (1.58) (0.22) (3.22)*** (2.51)** 
LEV -0.006 -0.011 0.030 0.005 0.029 0.042 0.028 0.004 
 (0.48) (0.64) (1.54) (0.54) (2.09)** (2.18)** (1.40) (0.42) 
Intercept 9.015 -5.149 38.546 38.144 35.730 25.703 37.557 39.345 
 (2.55)** (1.12) (8.88)*** (16.74)*** (10.33)*** (5.53)*** (8.52)*** (15.99)*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 
R-squared 0.405 0.339 0.368 0.323 0.404 0.337 0.367 0.327 
# Firms 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
t statistics in parentheses and * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. See Appendix for variables definitions.  
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Table 5 
Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) Regression 
 
Panel A. First Stage Regression: Determinants of Board Networks 
 
 DEGREE CLOSE EIGEN BETWEEN INFO 
DEGREEt-1 0.008     
 (43.34)***    
CLOSEt-1  0.007    
  (30.70)***   
EIGENt-1   0.006   
   (20.29)***  
BETWEENt-1    0.007  
    (20.97)*** 
INFOt-1     0.007 
     (23.32)*** 
HHI 0.018 0.038 0.254 0.036 0.009 
 (7.15)*** (4.68)*** (7.72)*** (6.40)*** (2.07)** 
PCTWBOD 0.0002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.0002 
 (2.49)** (2.21)** (2.73)*** (3.42)*** (1.77)* 
BSIZE 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 
 (4.01)*** (4.42)*** (3.27)*** (3.04)*** (4.82)*** 
BINDEP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (2.12)** (2.50)** (1.35) (1.71)* (2.32)** 
TENURE 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.37) (1.47) (0.36) (0.01) (1.71)* 
AGE -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (1.31) (0.72) (0.42) (1.13) (0.77) 
EDUCATION -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.24) (0.45) (1.06) (0.30) (0.29) 
GENDER 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.47) (0.24) (0.65) (0.09) (0.70) 
BBOARD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (3.66)*** (2.75)*** (1.46) (2.96)*** (2.59)*** 
INSTI -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.50) (2.60)*** (0.48) (0.16) (2.23)** 
ROA 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.16) (0.22) (0.26) (0.11) (0.30) 
LEV -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.98) (1.45) (0.49) (0.84) (1.85)* 
Intercept -0.005 0.020 -0.081 -0.009 0.019 
 (2.39)** (2.97)*** (5.57)*** (2.26)** (4.77)*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 
R-squared 0.710 0.703 0.521 0.560 0.651 
HHI represents product market concentration and PCTWBOD represents the percentage of women boards.  
t statistics in parentheses and * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. See Appendix for variables definitions.   
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Panel B 
Second Stage Regression: Linear Regression of Board Networks on ESG 
 ESG ENV SOC GOV ESG ENV SOC GOV ESG ENV SOC GOV 
DEGREEt-1 0.642 0.696 0.241 0.535         
 (2.69)*** (2.20)** (0.84) (3.31)***         
CLOSEt-1     0.242 0.247 0.152 0.202     
     (3.06)*** (2.35)** (1.60) (3.76)***     
EIGENt-1         0.043 0.037 0.006 0.056 
         (1.83)* (1.74)* (0.14) (2.18)** 
Intercept 7.480 -6.428 12.987 37.110 5.865 -8.107 12.081 35.762 7.241 -6.730 12.794 37.004 
 (2.46)** (1.59) (3.55)*** (17.98)*** (1.92)* (1.99)** (3.28)*** (17.23)*** (2.37)** (1.66)* (3.50)*** (17.89)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 
R-squared 0.404 0.338 0.364 0.323 0.405 0.338 0.365 0.324 0.402 0.336 0.364 0.321 
# Firms 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
t statistics in parentheses and * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. See Appendix for variables definitions.  
 
Panel B (continued) 
Second Stage Regression: Linear Regression of Board Networks on ESG  
 ESG ENV SOC GOV ESG ENV SOC GOV 
BETWEENt-1 0.318 0.292 0.312 0.271     
 (2.42)** (1.68)* (1.99)** (3.04)***     
INFOt-1     0.451 0.458 0.324 0.362 
     (2.96)*** (2.26)** (1.77)* (3.50)*** 
Intercept 7.395 -6.578 14.567 37.045 6.849 -7.100 12.683 36.589 
 (2.43)** (1.63) (4.13)*** (17.94)*** (2.25)** (1.76)* (3.48)*** (17.75)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 
R-squared 0.404 0.337 0.364 0.322 0.405 0.338 0.365 0.324 
# Firms 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
t statistics in parentheses and * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. See Appendix for variables definitions.  
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Panel C 
Second Stage Regression: Quadratic Regression of Board Networks on ESG 
 ESG ENV SOC GOV ESG ENV SOC GOV ESG ENV SOC GOV 
DEGREEt-1 2.310 2.929 1.695 0.713         
 (3.59)*** (3.59)*** (2.00)** (1.76)*         
DEGREEt-1
2 -0.504 -0.676 -0.434 -0.053         
 (2.89)*** (3.15)*** (1.80)* (0.47)         
CLOSEt-1     2.203 2.685 2.166 0.467     
     (4.54)*** (4.15)*** (3.84)*** (1.93)*     
CLOSEt-1
2     -0.082 -0.102 -0.084 -0.011     
     (4.16)*** (3.86)*** (3.70)*** (0.80)     
EIGENt-1         0.325 0.403 0.163 0.207 
         (4.12)*** (3.80)*** (1.74)* (3.65)*** 
EIGENt-1
2         -0.012 -0.016 -0.007 -0.006 
         (4.60)*** (4.58)*** (2.24)** (3.11)*** 
Intercept 8.284 -6.139 14.249 38.033 0.118 -18.161 10.617 36.209 9.051 -5.117 14.816 38.206 
 (2.34)** (1.33) (3.47)*** (16.61)*** (0.03) (3.18)*** (2.11)** (12.66)*** (2.56)** (1.11) (3.60)*** (16.71)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 
R-squared 0.407 0.340 0.368 0.324 0.410 0.343 0.371 0.325 0.407 0.340 0.367 0.324 
# Firms 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
t statistics in parentheses and * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Appendix for variables definitions.  
Panel C (continued) 
Second Stage Regression: Quadratic Regression of Board Networks on ESG 
 ESG ENV SOC GOV ESG ENV SOC GOV 
BETWEENt-1 0.774 1.117 -0.562 0.501     
 (2.76)*** (3.01)*** (2.24)** (2.59)***     
BETWEENt-12 -0.074 -0.133 0.110 -0.037     
 (1.94)* (2.68)*** (3.37)*** (1.44)     
INFOt-1     1.433 2.103 0.966 1.687 
     (2.58)*** (2.69)*** (1.16) (2.55)** 
INFOt-12     -0.224 -0.333 -0.167 -0.148 
     (2.41)** (2.55)** (1.20) (1.03) 
Intercept 9.015 -5.149 38.546 38.144 35.730 25.703 37.557 39.345 
 (2.55)** (1.12) (8.88)*** (16.74)*** (10.33)*** (5.53)*** (8.52)*** (15.99)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 1724 
R-squared 0.405 0.339 0.368 0.323 0.404 0.337 0.367 0.327 
# Firms 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 
t statistics in parentheses and * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Appendix for variables definitions.  
